ABSTRACT
This chapter highlights that memory must be involved in one's temporal consciousness via the notorious slogan that a succession of experiences is not, in and of itself, an experience of succession. This leads to the introduction of a traditional memory theory and, by way of objections, its replacement by a more refined version. The chapter discusses how these theories relate to Dainton's influential cinematic/retentional/extensional trichotomy of models of temporal consciousness. It suggests that, contra certain contemporary theorists, there are grounds for thinking that some form of memory is involved in all variants of the class of models which Dainton calls retentional. The chapter introduces a further issue, namely whether retentions can occur in the absence of prior experience of the retained contents. Many contemporary retentionalists insist they can. The chapter also suggests that appreciating Husserl's version of retentionalism threatens to subvert Dainton's distinction between retentional and extensional models.
