ABSTRACT
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is arguing against interpreting the claim that "the truth of consciousness lies in self-consciousness" involves a disappearance of the world into moments of a self-positing world creation. There is no claim that "all of reality is ultimately the content of my mental states", and Hegel's criticism of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte is directed at the emptiness of their notions of apperception, not at all that they have not successfully understood world creating acts. Hegel says that the objective moments are "preserved". When Axel Honneth summarizes the convergence with Kant, he talks about a subject "aware of its constitutive, world-creating cognitive acts". The Kantian analogue is that experience requires a categorical structure that is not itself derived. The determination of these categorical moments is a self-determination of our cognitive power, a self-determination that determines what must be the case, with transcendental necessity.
