ABSTRACT
One aim of this volume is to illustrate how fruitful the interdisciplinary dialogue between psychoanalysts and contemporary scientists from the broad field of neuroscience can be for both sides. As mentioned in the introduction to this book, it is interesting from a perspec-
tive of the history and sociology of science that since the 1990s many different scientific disciplines have intensified their interest in the so-called mind-bodyproblem: psychoanalysis, philosophy, academic psychology, cognitive science and modern neurosciences. In cognitive science, e.g., 20 years ago some kind of a revolution took place: from the “Classical to Embodied Cognitive Science”.1 The conceptualization of how the mind works has changed completely and, as will be shown in this chapter, has great implications for clinical psychoanalytical practice as well as for theorizing in contemporary psychoanalysis. The question how unrepresented, unconscious meanings can be discovered, remembered and worked through is and has been, as is well known, one of the central topics of psychoanalysis (see, e.g., Levine, Reed & Scarfone, 2013). In this chapter we will concentrate on one example of a contemporary inter-
disciplinary dialogue, the dialogue between psychoanalysis and the so-called Embodied Cognitive Science. This dialogue is relatively new and not yet very well known in the psychoanalytical world. The two authors of this chapter have been involved in this dialogue for nearly four decades (see, e.g., Pfeifer & LeuzingerBohleber, 1986, 1991, 1992, 1995; Leuzinger-Bohleber & Pfeifer, 1998, 2002a, b,
2004, 2006, 2013a, b; Leuzinger-Bohleber, Henningsen & Pfeifer, 2008), an inspiring experience for both of them (see Leuzinger-Bohleber, 2015). In this paper, we focus on one aspect of this dialogue: the illustration of how this interdisciplinary dialogue may inspire the clinical psychoanalytical practice. According to our experiences, it opens the mind of the psychoanalysts to understand unconscious processes in the transference/countertransference situation in a new and, as we think, innovative way. This is particularly true for working with severely traumatized patients, as we will try to illustrate. Understanding their unconscious “embodied memories” may lead to a structural change in their feelings, cognitions and behavior – which, for Mrs. B., had an existential dimension for her life and the life of her whole family (see section 3). Memory has always been a central issue in psychoanalytic theory and prac-
tice. Many authors engaged in current debates on so-called false memories in the context of sexual abuse claim that observing “procedural memories” in the psychoanalytic situation opens a window for “stored knowledge” of experiences during the first years of life. Procedural memories, defined on a descriptive level as a specific form of long-term memory, cover mechanical and bodily skills (like eating with a knife and fork). As will be discussed in this chapter: in contrast to “procedural memory”, the concept of “embodied memories” is much more specific, and offers a more precise understanding of the so-called sensory-motor coordination of the traumatized patient in the psychoanalytic relationship. This unconsciously – in very specific situations – leads to the precise re-construction of the bodily sensations, affects and fantasies that match the original traumatic interaction. Their intensity and quality prove to be inappropriate in the present, new relationship with the analyst. For the patient, it is essential to decode in detail the specific (sensory-motor) stimuli that, because of their precise analogies, trigger the “embodied memories” of the traumatic experiences. We will try to illustrate that this means more than just “understanding procedural memories” and refer to the concept of “embodied memories”, which has been discussed it in detail in other publications (see, e.g., Leuzinger-Bohleber & Pfeifer, 2002a, b, 2006, 2013a; Leuzinger-Bohleber, 2015). To briefly summarize: Recent developments in cognitive science and the neu-
rosciences suggest that traditional notions of memory based on stored structures that are also often underlying psychoanalytic thinking cannot account for a number of fundamental phenomena and thus need to be revised. In this chapter, we suggest that memory be conceived as
• a theoretical construct explaining current behavior by reference to events that have happened in the past.
