ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on affect's role in collective intentions. Gurwitsch argues that empathy is necessary for all collective intentions, insofar as success in fulfilling one's collective intention requires understanding how the other takes one's meaning and modifying one's projection of meaning to be appreciable to the other. Empathy involves an emotionally constituted judgment. If empathy is itself constituted with affect, then collective intentional judgments would necessitate affect as well. Collective intentions require anticipating the other's reaction, and what one anticipates is dependent on the emotional commitments one has about the other and about the actions or roles to be undertaken. "Emotion is integral to protention, for protention always involves motivation, and affective tone, and an action tendency or readiness for action". Affect plays a constitutive role in what it is that one experiences and how one experiences it. Insofar as affect contributes to reasoning, action, and the selection of ends, affect plays a constitutive role in collective intentions.
