ABSTRACT

A central question along which phenomenological approaches to sociality or intersubjectivity have diverged concerns whether concrete, interpersonal encounters or sharing a common world is more fundamental in working out an adequate phenomenology of human sociality. Sartre, Martin Buber and others emphasize the priority of some mode of interpersonal encounters (broadly construed) in determining the basic character of human co-existence. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty argue that an adequate account of human sociality must begin with how we always already exist in a shared or common world. This chapter argues that existential phenomenologists such as the early Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty provide more compelling arguments in thi debate. Merleau-Ponty's view about the significance of human embodiment has important consequences for how to understand the nature of intersubjectivity. According to Merleau-Ponty, when perceiving other people's bodily activities, we perceive them as expressing distinctive powers or capacities that respond skilfully to the subtle solicitations of their surrounding environments.