ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Philippine military has seen its internal security role intensified in the wake of renewed terror attacks from Islamic militants and Moro separatists in the south. Despite prior reforms on the defense establishment and a modernization program geared ostensibly towards a shift to territorial defense, the military remains locally embedded, with fundamental consequences to democratic civilian control. Civil-military relations (CMR) in turn has taken a more subjective dimension following President Duterte’s repeated attempts to include the military in the war on drugs. This chapter examines Philippine CMR in the context of the country’s democratization experience following the ouster of dictator President Marcos in 1986. It maps the substantive changes in the constitutional/legal framework that underpin such engagement, the shifts in procedure, doctrines or policy thrust within the executive branch and military institution, and the military’s autonomous efforts at reinfecting professionalism into the organization. Focusing on internal security as an area of pronounced policy contestation, the chapter probes the dynamics and bargains related to human rights culpability, the separation of the police and creation of paramilitary for counterinsurgency operations, and local civilian oversight mechanisms. The chapter also looks at CMR on budget and other policy matters where military corporate interests are most pronounced. The CMR dynamics across these issue areas were time-sensitive, with “norming” becoming more evident as civilian authorities gained more footing. The Philippine military enjoyed substantial leverage over these policy areas it deemed important during the Corazon Aquino presidency. The normalization of CMR proceeded slowly with a policy solution to the military’s asset-poor condition and performance deficits in the anti-insurgency war under the Ramos administration. However, President’s Estrada’s ouster and the Oakwood mutiny against the Macapagal-Arroyo presidency point to disruptions in the formalization of CMR. While the military as an institution appear to increasingly accept oversight in functions (internal security, disaster response, peacekeeping), civilian authorities remain hampered by capability deficits and lack of willingness to assert control or oversight.
