chapter  5
Wittgenstein, Kripke and Non-Reductionism about Meaning
ByColin McGinn
Pages 11

This chapter begins by observing that whatever the content of truth rules may be, realist or verificationist, the intent or purpose of anyone engaged in making sincere assertions in a language must be to conform their sentences to these rules. The Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox is an apparent dead end people encounter when trying to explain what it is that constitutes a person's meaning something by a word. Humans are very sophisticated creatures. The hoverfly has as a biological purpose to follow the proximal hoverfly rule is quite different from saying that this rule is the only rule that fits the actual dispositions of normal hoverflies or of past hoverflies that managed to procreate. Proximal assertability rules would concern the most proximal conditions under which one should say or think certain things. Conformity to these rules would have, as a biological purpose, to effect conformity to distal rules, that is, to correspondence truth rules.