chapter  6
Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules
ByWarren Goldfarb
Pages 16

As Kripke presents the skeptical solution, a meaningful sentence will have both assertability conditions and a "role and utility" within the language games. The skeptical solution depicts this conception of how normativity arises as the product of a bizarre and ultimately incoherent mythologization of banal linguistic facts of an interrelated complex of facts about familiar linguistic practice. A number of his critics have objected to Kripke's framing of Wittgenstein's investigation of 'following a rule' in terms of a debate about semantic skepticism. Kripke says, "Wittgenstein's skepticism about the determination of future usage by the past contents of my mind is analogous to Hume's skepticism about the determination of the future by the past. The paradox can be resolved only by a skeptical solution of these doubts, in Hume's classic sense". Kripke simply says that the skeptical conclusion is insane and intolerable. But Kripke cannot mean here 'the skeptical conclusion' with which Wittgenstein is supposed to agree.