chapter  8
Meaning and Intention as Judgement Dependent
ByCrispin Wright
Pages 12

Kripke presented an argument to the effect that there can be no facts as to what someone means by a linguistic expression. In this argument, a central role is played by the contention that meaning is a normative notion. The Standard Normativity Argument arises from a certain interpretation of the claim that meaning is normative. The cencapsulates a widespread interpretation of Kripke's claim that the normative character of meaning invalidates dispositional accounts of meaning facts. Kripke's detailed discussion of dispositional accounts starts with the claim that a speaker's dispositions cannot determine how he should use an expression because they are finite, whereas the question of how an expression should be used should in principle receive an answer in infinitely many cases. At the end of his discussion of dispositional accounts, Kripke offers a gloss on their inability to ground normative claims about predicate ascriptions.