chapter  1
ByAlexander Miller
Pages 15

Colin McGinn's book belongs to the reaction to, and against Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. McGinn's apparently imperfect understanding of the role of the normativity of meaning in Kripke's dialectic does not prevent him from isolating its most vulnerable point. One point of difference between Kripke's Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein which has not been generally noted is that the regress-of-interpretations paradox of Investigations diverges in focus from Kripke's Skeptical Paradox. In addition, while Kripke's Skeptic directs his Paradox at the very existence of rules and rule-following, Wittgenstein's 'paradox' is directed, in intention at least, at what he regards as a misunderstanding of the nature and epistemology of rule-following -something which it should be possible to correct without calling into question the reality of rules. Wittgenstein is concerned to examine the idea that a rule can be genuinely an object of intellection, something whose requirements we keep track of by grace of some intuitive or interpretative ability.