On Kripke's reading, the passages on rule-following are concerned with some of the weightiest questions in the theory of meaning, questions involving the reality, reducibility, and privacy of meaning - that occupy centre-stage in contemporary philosophy. Kripke's first objection amounts, in effect, to suggesting that there will always be a serious indeterminacy in what my dispositions are, thus rendering dispositional properties an inappropriate reduction base for meaning properties. Goldfarb goes on to say that the idea of a solitary language is more general than that of a Wittgensteinian 'private language', for the latter essentially involves the idea of necessary unintelligibility to another. The argument against solitary language was supposed to flow from the adjusted understanding of sentence significance forced by the skeptical conclusion. The skeptical solution's recommendation is that we blunt the force of this result by refusing to think of sentence significance in terms of possession of truth conditions, or a capacity to state facts.