ABSTRACT

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was a contemporary of both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and a central figure in the Scottish School of Common Sense. Until recently, his work has been largely neglected, and often misunderstood. Like Kant, Reid cited Hume’s Treatise as the main spur to his own philosophical work. In Reid’s case, this led him to challenge ‘the theory of ideas’, which he saw as the cornerstone of Hume’s (and many other philosophers’) theories. For those familiar with Reid’s work, it is clear that its significance extends well beyond his challenging the theory of ideas.

The variety of topics which this book covers attests to the richness and variety of Reid’s philosophical contributions, and the persisting relevance of his work to contemporary philosophical debates. The work included in this book, by leading figures in Reid scholarship, deals with aspects of Reid’s views on topics ranging from perception, to epistemology, to ethics and meta-ethics, through to language, mind, and metaphysics. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

chapter 1|3 pages

Introducation

chapter 2|2 pages

Hume’s Argument

chapter 3|1 pages

Reid’s objections

chapter 4|2 pages

Hume’s sense of ‘Magnitude’

chapter 5|3 pages

Reid’s sense of magnitude

chapter 6|2 pages

A Humean response to Reid

chapter 7|3 pages

A case for representational realism

chapter 8|6 pages

A case for direct realism?

chapter 9|3 pages

Conclusions

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter 3|2 pages

Color and visible figure

chapter 4|4 pages

Reid’s argument in the Inquiry

chapter 5|1 pages

Stewart’s Dissertation (1815)

chapter 6|3 pages

Stewart’s letter to Reid

chapter 8|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |6 pages

Acknowledgements

chapter |3 pages

References

chapter 1|2 pages

Reid on the moral sense

chapter 2|4 pages

Perception

chapter 3|6 pages

Aesthetic perception

chapter 4|6 pages

The moral faculty

chapter 5|2 pages

Conclusion

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter |1 pages

References

part 7|1 pages

MORAL THEORY Reid’s moral psychology: animal motives as guides to virtue

chapter 1|1 pages

Terminology and context

chapter 2|2 pages

Animal motives: conceptions or judgments?

chapter 4|5 pages

Animal motives: guides to virtue

chapter 5|4 pages

Objections

chapter 6|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

Notes

part 8|1 pages

EPISTEMOLOGY Common sense in Thomas Reid

chapter 4|1 pages

Reid and his critics

chapter 5|2 pages

The circle of belief

chapter |2 pages

Notes

chapter 1|1 pages

Reid’s First Principle #7

chapter 2|2 pages

The puzzle of First Principle #7

chapter 4|2 pages

Against De Bary’s reading

chapter 5|4 pages

Why FP#7 is special after all

chapter 6|1 pages

Conclusion

chapter |2 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

References

part 11|12 pages

EPISTEMOLOGY Reason and trust in Reid

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter |1 pages

References

part 12|3 pages

MIND, LANGUAGE, METAPHYSICS Reid on powers of the mind and the person behind the curtain

chapter 1|2 pages

No inert intelligence

chapter 3|3 pages

Actions of another in us

chapter |1 pages

Notes

chapter |2 pages

References

chapter 2|2 pages

The distinction

chapter 3|4 pages

The argument

chapter 4|1 pages

An explanatory hypothesis

chapter |2 pages

Notes

part 14|1 pages

MIND, LANGUAGE, METAPHYSICS Disagreement, design, and Thomas Reid