ABSTRACT
My object in this paper is to show that Reid had a theory of the human mind containing a theory of truth, both of our evidence of truth and the conditions of truth, fully consistent with empiricism. His project was to articulate a theory of the human mind that was a better empirical theory than the ideal theory, advanced most notably by Hume (1739). To say that the theory was empirical is to say that the first principles of his theory, those that support the common sense claims to knowledge, evidence and truth of the judgments of consciousness, perception, memory, testimony, among others, are empirical and not a priori principles. The first principles are confirmed by the truth of the particular judgments of experience under those principles. The evidence of the first principles and evidence of the particular judgments of experience are both immediate and do not depend on reasoning. The justification and evidence of both is the result of our faculties, which are original and natural powers of our constitution manifested in first principles. These conceptions are not innate anymore than the first principles are a priori. The conceptions and convictions arise from our faculties in response to experience as a result of our natural development. Reid’s views on evidence, truth and knowledge are scattered in his works, but there is a system of these topics contained therein. My purpose here is to show that the subtle complexity of his
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NEW ESSAYS ON THOMAS REID
system, somewhat concealed, is a form of empiricism that combines elements of foundationalism, coherentism, falliblism and nominalism. Finally, I distinguish and compare Reid to Hume, Moore, Goldman, Quine, James and Wittgenstein.
