ABSTRACT
A problem reminiscent of the original problem of empty names remains. Any sentence that results from substituting an “empty proper name” for Vulcan will express the same proposition, which may seem unintuitive. However, this is only a real problem for semantic frameworks that do not have a way of offering an adequate account of belief contexts. Consider:
(14) (a) Urbain Le Verrier believes that Vulcan is a planet (b) Scott Soames believes that Vulcan is a planet Whereas traditional semantics predicts that 14(a)-(b) have the same truth-
value (false), the present semantics predicts that they have different truth-values. As Urbain Le Verrier engaged in cognitive acts of believing that predicated being a planet of Vulcan, the only admissible (non-normal) assignments to ‘Vulcan’ are planets. So, 14(a) comes out true. As Soames has no belief involving Vulcan, there are no admissible assignments of an extension to ‘Vulcan’.4 So, 14(b) and its negation are false.
