ABSTRACT
But, the fact that some propositions are possibly structurally indistinguishable from one another highlights a potentially powerful objection to the view I am advocating. It seems that, for any p and q, necessarily, the fact that p is structurally indistinguishable from q grounds the fact that p is identical to q. But, it’s also plausible that if one fact grounds another, then it’s necessary that the first fact obtains only if the second fact obtains. It seems to follow that, for any p and q, necessarily, if p is structurally indistinguishable from q, then p is identical to q. But, if the gappy propositions view I’m advocating is true, then the propositions that Obama is tall and that Romney is tall are possibly structurally indistinguishable from one another. So, since structural indistinguishability entails identity, if the view I’m advocating is true, then those propositions are possibly identical to one another. But, since, those propositions are actually distinct from one another; they can’t be possibly identical to one another. So, the objection goes, the view in question must be mistaken.
