ABSTRACT
To speak of feminist phenomenology, or of how feminist philosophers have appropriated phenomenological methods and sources, is to speak in the plural. There are multiple ways in which one could broach how phenomenology has influenced feminist theory. It is perhaps commonplace to begin a discussion of phenomenology with an account of the "phenomenological reduction". In its simplest form, the reduction is about "putting into brackets" attitudes to the world, in particular causal-scientistic and naturalistic ones. The problem of phenomenology as feminist methodology was clearly exposed in a debate between Joan Scott and Linda Martín Alcoff on the status of lived experience for feminist theory. To introduce more complexity into the phenomenological account, gender cannot be understood to be the only denominator according to which the spatial world is differentiated, nor is there one single denominator. By dwelling in and mining the affective tissue of intersubjective life, bodily experience can become the source of phenomenological questioning.
