ABSTRACT
According to Peirce, pragmatism is Kantianism without things in themselves: "The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly". Peirce was surely correct in thinking that from a Kantian perspective the label "pragmatism" was much more fitting for his own philosophy than "practicalism" or "practicism". However, this is not for the reason Peirce himself offers, since "praktisch" and "pragmatisch" in Kant are by no means opposites. A comparison of Kant's and Peirce's conceptions of belief reveals both deep similarities and important differences. Both Kant and Peirce think of belief as a conscious theoretical propositional attitude that is essentially linked to action. For both, the link between belief and action consists in the belief's serving as a basis for action in a two fold sense.
