This chapter discusses Martin Heidegger's account of the self as it figures in questions of autonomy and authenticity. In Division Two, by contrast, Heidegger's discussion of the self centers on the authenticity thesis. Heidegger's being and Time connects the autonomy thesis and the authenticity thesis in a distinctive way. The way to be authentic or "true" to the self, Heidegger argues, is to achieve self-constancy in one's existence. The thought that Heidegger has no place for the self in his phenomenology is encouraged by the fact that Heidegger's few concise and direct assertions regarding his positive understanding of the self are dispersed throughout Division Two of Being and Time. The clearest example Heidegger offers is that of the hammer: 'what we call a hammer', Heidegger explains, 'has an affordance for hammering, with hammering, it has an affordance for fastening, with fastening, it has an affordance for protection from the weather'.