ABSTRACT
This chapter sketches Bjorn Ramberg's arguments that Donald Davidson's distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional should be seen as post-ontological rather than ontological. It outlines John McDowell's view that a Davidsonian truth-conditional theory of meaning should rather be seen as anti-anti-realist, as upholding the irreducibility of the intentional without making an ontological claim. The chapter argues that the very different verdicts that Ramberg and McDowell on the one hand, and Richard Rorty, on the other, pass on Davidson's philosophy, as held captive by an ontological dualism, or as potentially paving the way for a pragmatism compatible with a notion of objectivity, turn on the role played by the notion of truth in Davidson's philosophy, and consequently, the role truth can play in a renewed pragmatism. It also argues that in light of Rorty's recent concession to Davidson and Ramberg, we are justified in perceiving McDowell's anti-anti-realism as pragmatism.
