chapter  7
The Arguments for and the Reasoning about Epistemic Cognition
ByPATRICIA A. ALEXANDER
Pages 11

Let me begin this response to the diverse and informative chapters that populate the section of the Handbook on Epistemic Cognition (Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016/ this volume) entitled “Psychological Perspectives on Epistemic Cognition” by taking as a given (at least for the moment) that the pursuit of knowledge and the act of knowing often require individuals to engage in reflective and effortful thought. Moreover, such reflective and effortful thought may well entail some manner of logical or causal reasoning, the weighing of evidence and claims, the contemplation or construction of arguments, and a judgment as to the intentions and goals of self and others. Moreover, let me acknowledge that, at present, the rich and expanding literature pertaining to epistemic beliefs, values, or goals is truly in need of more coherence and consistency in the language employed to signify those aforementioned aspects of knowledge pursuit and knowledge justification. If those were the sole objectives or claims forwarded in the contributions populating this section then my response would be done. I would have nothing further to question, nothing more to argue.