ABSTRACT

below that outlet. If this is to be done, then the question o f how the much enhanced discretionary power in the hands of the engineers is to be disciplined needs careful thought [Wade, 1982a].However, it is certainly possible that tail-end villages can offset to some extent their locational disadvantage by offering bribes, and that this makes for a spatial re-allocation from upstream areas where the marginal pro­ductivity o f water is lower, to where it is higher-a re-allocation which would not be made in the absence of an (illicit) incentive to irrigation staff to patrol upstream sluices more vigorously than they would otherwise. In this sense the corrupt system could promote efficiency and equity. One can identify tail-end villages or distributories which almost certainly would not have received water during a shortage had the irrigation staff not worked much harder than usual to bring water down-because they were being paid to do so. If-and there do seem to be cases-upstream villages did not suffer corresponding losses o f yield because o f the sending o f more water downstream, this would be a gain for efficiency as well as equity.However, my strong impression is that this pulling in o f water to tail-end villages by means of bribes does not happen on a big scale, sufficient to offset the adverse effects o f the general increase in uncertainty which it is in the engineers’ interest to promote.48 It must be remembered that the prospect o f additional income from working hard to push water to tail-end villages is not a sufficient condition for such extra effort by irrigation staff, because they can make plenty o f money ‘from works’ with little effort and plenty more ‘from the ayacuf merely by cutting off or threatening to cut off supplies to vulnerable areas (upstream as well as downstream), or even just by rumour­ing a shortage. (2) Interest in scientific principles and operational reform: The preoccupation of the EE and AEs with running a vast financial enterprise would seem likely to blunt their interest in canal operation as a serious and demanding professional and intellectual activity. They can make plenty o f money without running the system well. For the same reason they can be expected to oppose any reform which might weaken their hold over O & M decisions [Ali, 1980]. For example, the Irrigation Department has shown no interest in involving farmers more systematically in major O & M matters; and has often been lax to the point o f negligence in informing farmers about changes or expected changes in water supply. Relatedly, in one southern state where a new department o f Command Area Development was set up (at World Bank prompting) to concern itself with ways o f improving the performance of existing canal systems, the Irrigation Department has opposed it tooth and nail, even in its activities below the outlet and still more so in its attempts to influence how the main systems are being run. (3) Credibility o f Irrigation Department: In the eyes o f farmers, the Irrigation Department’s announcements on matters such as when the canal will be opened at the start o f the first irrigation season, when it is to be closed, and how much water is available, are not to be trusted. Farmers are liable to take the EE’s warnings that water will be short in the second season as a signal to start coming forward with bribes. Thus the workable authority o f the

Registered in England & Wales No. 3099067
5 Howick Place | London | SW1P 1WG© 2023 Informa UK Limited