![smca ep kteicwa ater allocation work more like a market. All the more should one be g ra otveeronfml of the argument which says in en ve tsatcm ti eonnts ’ m [L oerfef, p1r9 ed 70 ic t ( a1b9 le 6 , thaantdchoern ru ce p t ‘ icoonrraulp lo t w io snfcaarnmienrcsrteoam4): 515, speaking abo se atkheeeCcoounnotm rie ic s ]. effects of bribe payments by businessmen in L ut estsheDedvee si lroapbelde ad T ve hresreeea ff reec , ts honw ot eevder, abso ome points which have to qualify the generally pmaetrteelryn th st articcto ly rrfuop ll t o io wnedp ; ayvme. en It tsw sh ou ou ld ld c ertainly be mistaken to advocate ecological sense. Second, for the zoning b it eseellf im niontatuendcaonmdmtohne ly cr ompak zo es ninnogs in htoerrte -s tteerdm le m ss aitn er lioanlgb -t eenremindeaveploolp it m ic eanltegnova ir ls ontm ha enntinwthheeredip sb o u li r ti sce ians are political commitment to ir fi rtisgatto io n th ionsveesw tm heonts , u w pp h o ic rhtitnhesm om , ethIendciomn ent of accounts for over half the state’s development budget yet has agaensissttaetn es t p so e m rio et dho in fgfitvoed to otw en it hyetahreswoarym in or w e, h needs ex station abundant stream of short-term mat iecrh ia ilrb ri egp at la io in nin in g v . e P st e m rh eanptsdtohees answer has both politicians and state nefits able to be profit epdro fr v o id meabnyc fi onrarnucpetd io onuitno co f m hi egshewrotualxde ge o n ff e ic riaatles . pr T e hirdly, the elimination of officials’ These points are not inte s would prob s a su b r ly eswfoorrsesn al a in ry coim nc ereda is se tr s i , bwuh ti iocnh . 4i9feofvfeerca ts ll liass te se dssem ar e li netr , obfutthonndleydaassaancionm di pcrae ti hoen nsive qualification of the adverse e economic effects. of the complexity of making an cSoen veral indi f c in at eedbtio ts ooufr evidence suggest that the practices described here are not o f the Ksoassi im ca i n la p r articu al m sy escthlaanr em is state. in mBoifhsAalreeo ce ar re fpn ir tre ig naq orts t u io ir nypionstas nother southern state about 30 per cent of the bill to Supervisors tahnadtcaobnotvreatchteorres . 5n0oPramnat’ l s ly stguidvye4o0 ff itcoe5s0 ta p ff e ; racbeonuttto10bteosp 20 en pteorncetnhtetahcetyuaklew ep oraksst heir o , and 10 per cent to reports, without elaboration, ‘Postings in places o [1 f9c7h9o : w1n27p ] r . o T fi h t, elseaam vi engstoundlyy ( odfem sig onneoyr ’ in [1 v9e7s9 ti : g a 12 ti 8 o ] n . s T ) h to ewRoerpkorutno it fstihnevoSlavnetthraainnasm ac tCicoe or onmsmoffrhoumgenaomn-owuonrtks Gove W rn emw en er teotfoI ld ndb ia ytaolianrvgeestn ig uam te bewrayosfowf preventing corru it ptteieo , n s , est ta utpesb : y c th oensG tr ouvce ti ronnm , epnutr , cahar se e , guslaalres, pearncdenottahgeirtnreesgsuelsarthbautsiinneaslslocnonb tr eahcatlsfooffo tr f a fi ncs ia alcsticoonn , caen rn detdh . is W is eswhearreedtoilndat gre e is pai hat e d in ptrhoepcoord ti o by nstr nusa th ct meo ion n pa sgroftth ies th eevtaoPr io th uesW off osrhkosotDs— ep R ar W tm ], enst [of which the states’ Irrigation Departments ubalriecm in adnin ff eircu . l . t . y . aInndaldlceavseens , tfo eleven per cent was usually paid in this Ministry o f Home e A la ff yai in ai rs, g1el9tutr6i4neg to : 1t0hp ] e a . ybt il h ls eppear id ce n [I tnadgiea , r es Guo lt vser in nvmaern ia tbolfy ,](https://images.tandf.co.uk/common/jackets/crclarge/978113896/9781138967571.jpg "smca ep kteicwa ater allocation work more like a market. All the more should one be g ra otveeronfml of the argument which says in en ve tsatcm ti eonnts ’ m [L oerfef, p1r9 ed 70 ic t ( a1b9 le 6 , thaantdchoern ru ce p t ‘ icoonrraulp lo t w io snfcaarnmienrcsrteoam4): 515, speaking abo se atkheeeCcoounnotm rie ic s ]. effects of bribe payments by businessmen in L ut estsheDedvee si lroapbelde ad T ve hresreeea ff reec , ts honw ot eevder, abso ome points which have to qualify the generally pmaetrteelryn th st articcto ly rrfuop ll t o io wnedp ; ayvme. en It tsw sh ou ou ld ld c ertainly be mistaken to advocate ecological sense. Second, for the zoning b it eseellf im niontatuendcaonmdmtohne ly cr ompak zo es ninnogs in htoerrte -s tteerdm le m ss aitn er lioanlgb -t eenremindeaveploolp it m ic eanltegnova ir ls ontm ha enntinwthheeredip sb o u li r ti sce ians are political commitment to ir fi rtisgatto io n th ionsveesw tm heonts , u w pp h o ic rhtitnhesm om , ethIendciomn ent of accounts for over half the state’s development budget yet has agaensissttaetn es t p so e m rio et dho in fgfitvoed to otw en it hyetahreswoarym in or w e, h needs ex station abundant stream of short-term mat iecrh ia ilrb ri egp at la io in nin in g v . e P st e m rh eanptsdtohees answer has both politicians and state nefits able to be profit epdro fr v o id meabnyc fi onrarnucpetd io onuitno co f m hi egshewrotualxde ge o n ff e ic riaatles . pr T e hirdly, the elimination of officials’ These points are not inte s would prob s a su b r ly eswfoorrsesn al a in ry coim nc ereda is se tr s i , bwuh ti iocnh . 4i9feofvfeerca ts ll liass te se dssem ar e li netr , obfutthonndleydaassaancionm di pcrae ti hoen nsive qualification of the adverse e economic effects. of the complexity of making an cSoen veral indi f c in at eedbtio ts ooufr evidence suggest that the practices described here are not o f the Ksoassi im ca i n la p r articu al m sy escthlaanr em is state. in mBoifhsAalreeo ce ar re fpn ir tre ig naq orts t u io ir nypionstas nother southern state about 30 per cent of the bill to Supervisors tahnadtcaobnotvreatchteorres . 5n0oPramnat’ l s ly stguidvye4o0 ff itcoe5s0 ta p ff e ; racbeonuttto10bteosp 20 en pteorncetnhtetahcetyuaklew ep oraksst heir o , and 10 per cent to reports, without elaboration, ‘Postings in places o [1 f9c7h9o : w1n27p ] r . o T fi h t, elseaam vi engstoundlyy ( odfem sig onneoyr ’ in [1 v9e7s9 ti : g a 12 ti 8 o ] n . s T ) h to ewRoerpkorutno it fstihnevoSlavnetthraainnasm ac tCicoe or onmsmoffrhoumgenaomn-owuonrtks Gove W rn emw en er teotfoI ld ndb ia ytaolianrvgeestn ig uam te bewrayosfowf preventing corru it ptteieo , n s , est ta utpesb : y c th oensG tr ouvce ti ronnm , epnutr , cahar se e , guslaalres, pearncdenottahgeirtnreesgsuelsarthbautsiinneaslslocnonb tr eahcatlsfooffo tr f a fi ncs ia alcsticoonn , caen rn detdh . is W is eswhearreedtoilndat gre e is pai hat e d in ptrhoepcoord ti o by nstr nusa th ct meo ion n pa sgroftth ies th eevtaoPr io th uesW off osrhkosotDs— ep R ar W tm ], enst [of which the states’ Irrigation Departments ubalriecm in adnin ff eircu . l . t . y . aInndaldlceavseens , tfo eleven per cent was usually paid in this Ministry o f Home e A la ff yai in ai rs, g1el9tutr6i4neg to : 1t0hp ] e a . ybt il h ls eppear id ce n [I tnadgiea , r es Guo lt vser in nvmaern ia tbolfy ,")
ABSTRACT
make water allocation work more like a market. All the more should one be sceptical o f the argument which says that corruption allows farmers to make government actions more predictable, and hence ‘corruption can increase the rate o f investment’ [Leff, 1970 (1964): 515, speaking about the desirable economic effects o f bribe payments by businessmen in Less Developed Countries].There are, however, some points which have to qualify the generally adverse effects noted above. It would certainly be mistaken to advocate merely that corruption payments should be eliminated and the crop zoning pattern strictly followed; for the zoning itself not uncommonly makes no ecological sense. Second, in a political environment where politicians are interested less in long-term development goals than in the disbursement o f short-term material benefits to those who support them, the consistent political commitment to irrigation investment, which in some Indian states accounts for over half the state’s development budget yet has a gestation period o f five to ten years or more, needs explaining. Perhaps the answer has something to do with the way in which irrigation investment does provide an abundant stream o f short-term material benefits able to be profited from by both politicians and state officials. Thirdly, the elimination o f officials’ corruption incomes would generate pressures for salary increases, which if financed out o f higher taxes would probably worsen income distribution.49 These points are not intended as a comprehensive qualification o f the adverse effects listed earlier, but only as an indication o f the complexity o f making an overall assessment o f the economic effects. IRRIGATION IN OTHER STATES Several bits o f evidence suggest that the practices described here are not confined to our particular state. A recent enquiry in another southern state indicates a similar mechanism o f sale o f irrigation posts there.50 Pant’s study o f the Kosi canal system in Bihar reports that contractors normally give about 30 per cent of the bill to Supervisors and above, and 10 per cent to office staff; about 10 to 20 per cent they keep as their own profit, leaving only 40 to 50 per cent to be spent on the actual works [1979: 127]. The same study reports, without elaboration, ‘Postings in places of choice or from non-work (design or investigations) to work units involve transactions o f huge amounts of money’ [1979: 128]. The Report o f the Santhanam Committee, set up by Government o f India to investigate ways o f preventing corruption, states: We were told by a large number o f witnesses that in all contracts o f construction, purchase, sales, and other regular business on behalf o f the Government, a regular percentage is paid by the parties to the transaction, and this is shared in agreed proportions among the various officials concerned. We were told that in the constructions o f the Public Works Department [of which the states’ Irrigation Departments are offshoots-RW], seven to eleven per cent was usually paid in this manner . . . . In all cases, failure to pay the percentage results invariably in difficulty and delay in getting the bills paid [India, Government of, Ministry o f Home Affairs, 1964: 10].
