ABSTRACT
In this chapter we will discuss a further issue in epistemology (a topic we previously covered in Chapter 2), but in doing so we will also introduce an important debate in the history of modern philosophy. This epistemological issue is the extent to which we should form our own beliefs based on the testimony of others. By testimony, philosophers typically mean more than just the sort of evidence one might give in a court of law or to a police investigation. They mean anything one hears or reads about from other people rather than witnessing or deducing it oneself. (So, for example, what you are reading right now counts as testimony from the authors of this chapter.) Much of what we believe rests on testimony in this sense. Think,
right now, of the many things that you believe, such as your belief about what the capital of Venezuela is, or your belief about how a television works. You will undoubtedly find that many of these beliefs were acquired by listening to the word of others, either directly (e.g. by being told these ‘facts’ by someone, such as a teacher), or indirectly (e.g. by reading these ‘facts’ in a textbook, or hearing them being said in a documentary). Moreover, notice that a great deal of what you believe on the basis of testimony could only be acquired in this way. There are many things that one simply couldn’t reasonably find out for oneself, and where we need to trust the word of others if we are to form a judgment at all. Clearly, however, one shouldn’t believe just anything that one is told; that is a recipe for gullibility. So how does one decide when to form one’s beliefs on the basis of testimony, and when not to? This particular epistemological question was a central issue in the
Enlightenment, which was an important period of intellectual history, roughly from 1700 to 1800. It was during this period that ideas like
reason, science and democracy were on the rise, while ideas like divine rule, religious revelation and tradition were under pressure. Scotland was an important area where the Enlightenment got a foothold, and Scottish intellectuals played a key role in this vibrant period of intellectual change. A key figure of the Scottish Enlightenment was David Hume (1711-76).
While he is now mostly known as a philosopher, in his lifetime he was almost certainly more widely known as an historian (his History of England was a best-seller of its day). His masterpiece A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) is still widely regarded as one of the best pieces of philosophical writing ever. It is famous for its rigorous empiricism, naturalistic world view and sceptical conclusions. Hume’s empiricist idea was that everything that can be known will be known when it is known through careful empirical observation. This led him to seek naturalistic explanations of various phenomena about the human mind and will. This means that, unlike many of his contemporaries, he was sceptical of supernatural explanations. So rather than appealing to the power of God or the spirit inside of us to explain observable phenomena in the human mind, he sought to apply the same empirical scientific method that was at the time becoming more and more entrenched in the explanation of other natural phenomena. Because of this, Hume was very sceptical of religion. This connects to the topic of this chapter because Hume was scep-
tical of miracles, especially of the sort that we read about in religious texts such as the Bible. The connection to the topic of this chapter is that most people learn about miracles not by witnessing them first hand but rather by hearing or reading about them from other people – that is, through testimony. In section 10 of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume argued that we almost certainly won’t find compelling testimony to miracles. We will discuss his argument in more detail below. In his own day, the main opponent of Hume’s view about miracles
and testimony was Thomas Reid (1710-96). He was a minister in the Church of Scotland and a Professor at the Universities of Aberdeen and Glasgow. He was most famous for his defence of common sense. In his most influential work, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), he wrote,
