ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the possibility of a form of interoceptive phenomenology. It investigates the distinctiveness of interoceptive experiences generally and, in particular, how certain recurrent modes of it afford a distinctive form of self-awareness. Interoception makes up a basic form of bodily self-awareness, where self and body is, as a matter of habit and fact, indistinguishable. The notion that interoceptive awareness is equivalent to a rudimentary self-awareness does not entail an adequate awareness of the self or even that there is an identical self of which can be adequately or inadequately aware. The chapter contrasts interoceptive self-awareness with certain reflexive experiences, and reviews some of Husserl's salient treatments of interoceptive phenomena. The curiousness of reflexives corresponding to instances of exteroception is that the object designated by the 'self' in those cases is something available to others. Interoception is a likely necessary condition for the differentiation of oneself from other entities in the world.
