ABSTRACT
After two Communist Spring Offensives failed in 1951, the Korean War settled into a stalemate. This military impasse, lasting from June 1951 to July 1953, has become the most forgotten phase of the “forgotten war.” The previous chapter describes how the first year of mobile warfare in Korea has been documented extensively in the West, but much less is known about the period of stalemate. Many historians have spent time bemoaning the political battle over truce negotiations that the next chapter addresses, to the extent that the history of the war of trenches has almost been lost. However, approximately 45 percent of all U.S. casualties tragically occurred after truce talks started in July 1951 (Hastings 1987). By 1952, Chinese forces in Korea had grown to a record high of 1.45 million, including 59 infantry divisions and 15 artillery divisions (Xu 1993). The troop strength of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Force (CPVF) remained stable until the signing of the armistice in July 1953. Mao Zedong had committed nearly one quarter of China’s military strength to the defense of North Korea (Li 2007). Despite much bloody fighting during the last two years of the Korean War, the front lines remained essentially unchanged. Understanding the historiographical patterns in assessing the military stalemate is essential for appreciating the significant general trends in the military cultures of the United States and China.
