ABSTRACT
Knowledge about the neurological structures and functions which underlie human action has advanced rapidly in recent decades. This knowledge has not, however, been widely applied to theories of crime. One reason for this is that few theories accurately define crime and identify it as a type of action (and subsequently recognize that psychophysiology plays a significant role in action). Another is that most theories which do address action cognition focus on the content (e.g. opportunities, consequences) but not the processes through which that content is applied to action. Content, obviously, is of key importance, but it cannot be applied effectively to action unless the right processes are in place, and those processes will be governed by neurocognitive structures and functions. Criminological theories which do posit a process (e.g. rational choice) are typically uninformed, or ill-informed, about the psychophysiological mechanisms involved. My aim in this chapter is to look at one theory of crime – Situational Action Theory (SAT) – which tackles crime as a type of action and addresses the causal processes (mechanisms) which lead to crime (as well as their relevant content), and show how its framework is consistent with what we now know about the neuroscience of action decision making.
