ABSTRACT
This chapter seeks to illuminate, the US engaged reconstruction activities, including infrastructure, democratization, and economic recovery, not after war but as an extension of war. Reconstruction activities in Iraq diverged widely from conventional post-war tasks because the invasion was meant to build a new state on what was left of the old one. Focusing on the case of Iraq, the chapter argues that the desire to rebuild the Iraqi state according to US geopolitical interests long preceded the invasion, which was undertaken to break and re-make the state. The resulting state failure that led to civil war and ethno-sectarian conflict was not, however, part of that plan, although it had been predicted. Reconstruction is often subsumed under the mantle of peace along with related tasks, especially peacekeeping, socioeconomic development, and political reform. In the north and south of Iraq, the confusion between military and humanitarian interests became acute, with little or no meaningful reconstruction.
