ABSTRACT
Sociologists tend to view social order as an amalgamation of individuals and groups either competing for scarce resources (i.e. wealth, status, approval) or building consensus around shared values, norms, and beliefs. Even scholars who attempt to build their theoretical perspectives around the integration of both conflict and cooperation (Blau, 1964; Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1987 [1981]) have been accused of failing to give equal treatment to each type of collective phenomena (Archer, 1990; Parker, 2000). Furthermore, microsociology has not been immune to these paradigmatic battles. It was heavily critiqued during the late twentieth century for refusing to acknowledge inequality and conflict (Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds, 1975; Giddens, 1997; Gouldner, 1970; Haralambos, 1980). In response, a number of social psychologists practicing within the microsociology tradition countered that their approach to human interaction is fully capable of explicating power in processual terms (Athens, 2007; Collins, 1981, 2000; Dennis and Martin, 2005; Fine, 1984; Hall, 1985, 1987; Maines, 1982, 1989; Musolf, 1992; Prus, 1999; Puddephatt, 2013; Strauss, 1993). Although these sociologists provided ample evidence to support their claims, not all interpretive studies and their conceptual frameworks adequately address issues of conflict, constraint, and compromise. Research pockets remain within the microsociology paradigm that continue to neglect the structural effects constituting social order. Studies that incorporate the concept of boundary objects appear to be one such area.
