ABSTRACT
The expanded scope of human rights is a distinctive characteristic of the current stage of development of capitalist society. Human rights are, for better or for ZRUVHSDUWRIWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKZHQRZ¿QGRXUVHOYHVDQGWKHLUJURZWKPDUNV DVLJQL¿FDQWVKLIWLQWKHFKDUDFWHURIFRQWHPSRUDU\MXULGLFDOIRUPV$VZLWKPRVW RWKHUVRFLDOSKHQRPHQDRIRXUWLPHVWKHQRUPDWLYHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHH[SDQGHG scope of human rights is equivocal. Strong normative reasons have been put IRUZDUGWRDI¿UPLWVOHJLWLPDF\EXWVRWRRLWVFULWLFVKDYHSRLQWHGWRWKHLGHRORJLFDO and instrumental functions it performs in the modern world order. Some observers speak of an impending legitimacy crisis of human rights as the conditions of their success erode before our eyes. The turn to normative theory threatens to subsume the facticity of human rights to normative assessments, positive or negative, of their estimated worth. As a result we are faced with two temptations in social theory: one leans toward the idealisation of human rights, the other toward their devaluation or denigration. Both are problematic in obstructing what social theory does best: understanding the dynamics of the modern world and of the various deformations it engenders. I shall argue that the expanded scope of human rights represents a necessary development within the modern system of right as a whole and that we should resist any tendency to nullify it. On the other hand, it brings with it certain deformations we should recognise and learn to resist. The particular deformation I shall explore to illustrate this thesis is best known as the ‘Schmittian’ problem: that of deploying the idea of human rights to dehumanise those who are viewed as its transgressors. I shall suggest that this problem is visible in theory, practice and political argument and that the task of addressing it involves not only WKHIXUWKHU MXULGL¿FDWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVEXWDOVRWKHIRVWHULQJRIZKDW,FDOOD critical human rights culture.
