ABSTRACT
Reflecting on the peculiar paucity of empirical research in the sociology of law, Luhmann (1985) took note of the failure of sociology to take law and jurisprudence seriously. If autopoietic theory aspired to be a remedy, little has since changed. Leaving the study of law and jurisprudence to legal scholarship, sociology remains confined to investigation of law-related phenomena. Disparate empirical investigations (on, for example, the legal profession, judicial behaviour, opinion about the law, or differential access to it) tend to rest on ad hoc theorising and common-sense conceptions of law, with little bearing for a general theory of society. As a result, the sociology of law remains marginal, not only to the discipline of sociology, but also, and to their detriment, to sociolegal studies.2 In many respects, Friedman’s (1986) appraisal of sociolegal studies still rings true:
The missing core is law as a self-describing and functionally differentiated communication system.
