ABSTRACT
Since the adoption of the UDHR1 in 1948 it has become clear over the years that state responsibility for human rights violations ought to be complemented by perpetrators’ individual responsibility under criminal and civil law. This chapter focuses on the concept of individual responsibility, according to which the ‘natural’ corollary of a human rights violation is the criminal liability of the perpetrator, not under domestic law, but under international law. We shall examine to what degree this concept is applicable to all violations of human rights, and not simply in respect to some of them. This involves an examination of the legal basis of human rights violations – as these are contained in human rights treaties – in order to assess whether they can substantiate a degree of criminal liability. In the opinion of this author, the concept of individual responsibility is inextricably linked to the evolving nature of the status of the physical person in international law. International human rights law has played a prominent role in this regard, particularly through the establishment of individual complaint mechanisms and the granting of locus standi to aggrieved persons. Another theme examined is the employment of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the family of nations in order to give meaning to the existence of criminal liability; promulgating offences and establishing criminal liability, but without any efforts to prosecute the accused gradually weakens the argument in favour of individual responsibility as a matter of acquiescence.
