ABSTRACT
For the sake of constructing a reductio ad absurdum, I assume that open theists are right to conclude in the face of the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge (hereafter DFF) that God lacks exhaustive foreknowledge. From this assumption, I show why open theism logically entails the impossibility of divine knowledge of the present. I do so by arguing that open theism’s response to the DFF together with the metaphysics of free will and the metaphysics of time required in order for open theism to be properly motivated as a response to the DFF entails not only that God lacks knowledge of the future, but also that God lacks knowledge of any present truths involving free will. Because omniscience entails knowledge of all truths, I take as obvious that this is an undesirable conclusion for any theist. Hence, if my argument holds, open theism should be rejected.
