ABSTRACT
This chapter completes an adjustment in the form of replies and counter-replies in the confrontation between both positions. It considers from four points of view with the aim of emphasizing those underlying motives behind the ethical notion of natural law that require reformulating or particular emphasis. The chapter examines the links between synderesis and the commands of natural law on the use of practical reason and also faces the objection from the naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy identifies synderesis with a normative indeterminate enunciation or disregards it as a practically irrelevant tautology. Both the commands of natural law and the natural ends from which such commands derive are accompanied by the I-will, which is unavoidable for the ends to be consciously presented as wanted goods. Given that the individual reveals the author in his nature, natural law cannot be presented as a set of descriptive enunciations, exempt from the ethical acknowledgement of personal dignity.
