ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on a pivotal feature of Hutcheson's foundational theory of ethics that allows for and indeed requires the peculiar combination of sentimentalist, utilitarian and natural-law components just mentioned. Specifically, it concentrates on the theory of obligation that, as Hutcheson supposed, presents a radical alternative to the type of account of obligation that underlies the work of two key representatives of modern natural-law thinking: Richard Cumberland and Samuel von Pufendorf. Kant's assessment of Hutcheson and his place in the history of modern moral philosophy evidently diverges from the kind of interpretive view summarized in the chapter. Hutcheson targets both of these accounts of prescriptive natural law and the grounds of obligation, although he does this without taking special note of their basic difference in orientation with regard to the necessitation of God's will. Kant's works on moral philosophy give no indication that he was especially concerned about the seemingly eclectic character of Hutcheson's systematic thinking.
