ABSTRACT
When examining the existing literature on the League of Nations' approach to the Abyssinian crisis, it is impossible to escape negativity. The League's actions were too little too late and displayed an extraordinary lack of insight into the motives behind Mussolini's foreign policy, especially in North Africa. Indeed the discussions in Paris of a peace plan in December 1935 were to provide the context to a lengthy statement by Philip Noel-Baker about the legality and morality of the Abyssinian crisis. Noel-Baker was sceptical that Mussolini would take advantage of Pierre Étienne Flandin's offer and believed that the British government should take a lead in imposing oil sanctions not least in recognition of the already strong British military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. While military operations may have reached a denouement in Abyssinia, Noel-Baker's Labour-led British foreign policy would be rooted in continuing to oppose the Italian occupation through the use of sanctions.
