ABSTRACT
In the decade since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has been fighting a war in search of a strategy. US deficiencies in regard to grand strategy partly are the result of a major flaw in the current US civil-military relationship. The US military indisputably is subordinate to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and, ultimately, the president. Some policymakers and commentators, particularly in the period immediately following 9/11 attacks, indicated that ending terrorism should be the US goal in the GWOT, but that of course was so ambitious as to constitute strategic fantasy. In the years since the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism was initially released, US policy guidance on counterterrorism objectives has not become appreciably clearer. In recent decades, US military officers have come to see their duty in overly narrow terms, as mere operators who achieve whatever short-term military end is commanded by their civilian superiors.
