ABSTRACT
This chapter seeks to identify and analyze Chinese assessments of the country’s energy security situation and their means for addressing the associated vulnerabilities. We do so keeping in mind that energy has become a standard organizing prism through which academics, policy makers, and media commentators discuss China’s foreign policy decisions and future choices. Given the scale and pace of China’s economic and social development, short of a dramatic reduction in China’s reliance on external fossil energy supply, the question of ‘Who Will Fuel China?’ is set to remain attractive for continual research and analysis. Thus far, though, efforts aimed at promoting understanding between the epistemic communities of Chinese and foreign international relations scholars frequently end up with reinforcing perceptions of nation-state level competition out of geo-strategic considerations. With some but limited risk of oversimplifi cation, foreign (not restricted to Western) research agendas are predisposed to focus on disseminating the geopolitical motives behind China’s sourcing of fossil fuels from foreign lands through trade and investment, assessing Chinese energy companies’ performance in corporate social responsibility, especially in those societies where local regulatory mechanisms and their enforcement are not strong enough to suffi ciently impact investor behavior. 1 In contrast, Chinese participants in such discussions tend to favor stressing ‘win-win’ cooperation between China and the rest of the world, with the undertone being that the country’s right to energy access overrides calls for responsible behavior, whatever implied meaning therein. 2
In this chapter, we approach the topic by adopting the conceptual position that “the notion that a country can achieve true energy security is a myth.” Furthermore, “the cult of energy insecurity – the erroneous belief that national security requires ambitious and vigilant foreign policy measures to assure adequate access to energy” is a real problem, both in research and policy making. 3
The fact of the matter is that even before the dramatic decline of the world’s crude oil price since mid-2014 and the continuing slowdown of the Chinese economy, China was not as vulnerable in meeting its aggregate energy needs as is often perceived. As the Chinese government’s recent white paper on energy policy (2012) puts it, the country’s level of aggregate self-suffi ciency in energy stood at ninety percent. 4 According to statistics compiled by the International Energy Agency, in 2009, imports represented 15.7 percent of China’s total energy consumption. 5
A more pertinent observation is an assessment in the 2013 issue of BP Statistical Review of World Energy: China is among the large consuming countries that “saw below-average growth in energy consumption.” 6 Last but not least, ever since the early 1970s when China made the turn-around to reconnect with the capitalist world economic system, there have been no known incidents of deliberate disruption to fl ow of energy commodities from foreign locations into China.
