ABSTRACT
Since Skinner’s classic treatment of the reflex concept (1931), and his explication of the generic nature of stimuli and responses (1935), the identification and analysis of basic behavioral units has received only intermittent attention. At first, thoughtful psychologists examined the problem out of their concern with the systematic status of the new Behaviorism (e.g., MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948; Meehl, 1950), and with relations between Behaviorism and other approaches to the subject matter (e.g., Estes, Koch, MacCorquodale, Meehl, Mueller, Schoenfeld, & Verplanck, 1954; Goldiamond, 1962, 1966; Schoenfeld & Cumming, 1963). As experimental and applied Behavior Analysis grew in scope and power, however, the problem of behavioral units, seemingly of no practical importance, was swept under the rug. These developing sciences were busy, devising powerful techniques for altering behavior both in and out of the laboratory, describing behavior of ever greater complexity, and advancing principles to coordinate and unify seemingly unrelated behavioral phenomena. They rarely paused to examine their own internal structure. With some exceptions (e.g., Catania, 1984; Hineline, 1980; Goldiamond, 1975; Lee, 1983; Schoenfeld, 1976), self analysis has not been a major recent preoccupation of Behavior Analysis.
