ABSTRACT
A distinctive feature of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law is that it denies that judges have legitimate power to change the law. Dworkin set forth this argument in different ways from his first essays on jurisprudence in the 1960s and 1970s to the end of his career. This chapter traces the development of that argument from his early work to Law’s Empire. Dworkin introduces the idea of law as an ‘interpretive concept’, and in making that case relies at a crucial turn on the hermeneutic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ applies his more general theory of ‘constructive interpretation’ to the domain of legal adjudication. The legislature is the body responsible for the most important legal changes, in both common-law and civil-law systems, and is the institution with the capacities and competences best suited for creating legal change.
