ABSTRACT
In late 2010 and early 2011, millions of people in Tunisia and Egypt took to the streets rejecting not only authoritarianism but also the neoliberal model of development that resulted in declining living standards, high unemployment, and rising poverty. The initial post-revolutionary transition period was full of promises and potential for a new socio-economic order. Movements campaigned to “Drop the Debt” and revisit corrupt economic deals that took place under the old regimes (Gamal 2011, Ben Rouine 2013). At first glance, Tunisia and Egypt may appear to be on divergent paths: the former on the path to democracy and the latter reverting to authoritarian rule. Tunisia has been described as the “success case of democracy”, a model for the rest of the Arab world (Bellin 2014). In contrast, Egypt, with a former military general as its current president, is seen as a place where democracy has failed, and revolution has been aborted. There is ample reason for such claims; Tunisia has had a peaceful transfer of political power; its military has remained out of politics and its unions and social movements have paved the way for an active and vibrant civil society. Egypt, on the other hand, experienced a military coup against an elected government, resulting in the pervasive influence of the military in Egypt’s political and economic affairs. Despite these differences, I argue that there is a significant degree of convergence in the political economy of the two countries that has been missed by scholars who focus solely at the political level.
