ABSTRACT
Standard versions of libertarianism, and other choice-protecting rights-theories, hold that intruding upon an agent’s rights is authorized, and thus does not wrong her, only if she has given valid consent. I articulate and partly defend an alternative choice-prioritizing authorization condition. It holds that, when it is reasonably possible to communicate about consent, then valid consent is indeed necessary and sufficient for an authorization. When it is not reasonably possible to communicate about consent, however, it holds that a certain kind of hypothetical consent/dissent overrides actual valid consent/dissent and has priority over any appeal to interests. In the absence of hypothetical consent and dissent, and of valid consent and dissent, interests determine whether an intrusion is authorized. Such a choice-prioritizing conception of rights is, I claim, more plausible. If it is correct, then intruding upon a person’s rights for her own good need not wrong her (although typically it does).
