Dispositions as Properties

I have been working with the essentialist thesis which holds dispositions as properties. What is a disposition? In science one often comes across reference to such properties as solubility, fragility, conductivity, ductility and malleability that are said to be possessed by certain kinds of objects. These terms clearly indicate that they are dispositional terms meaning that they indicate the behaviour of a thing under certain circumstances, i.e. the way it is disposed to behave. Hence they are called disposition terms. These dispositional predicates seem to denote dispositional properties. In fact, some philosophers grant the status of properties to dispositions. Mumford, Molanar, Ellis and Bird hold the view that dispositions are properties. In my thesis I have critically examined whether dispositions deserve the status of properties. In particular I had considered in detail the view of Mumford and Molnar’s view that makes use of the idea of functional characterization and manifestation of dispositions in a significant way. In examining these views, I had argued how this idea of functional characterization is something that is not relevant to dispositions. During that time I had met Prof. Holm Tetens of Free University of Berlin and had the opportunity to discuss my research problem with him. ¹ During the course of the discussion he referred to one of his papers, ‘Teleology and the Concept’ (1989), where he had differentiated between a teleologically relevant event and a causal event. I draw upon Tetens’s work and the concept of information associated with teleology that further substantiates my argument against functional characterization of dispositions. I would first like to turn to the philosophical position that analyses the nature of such dispositional properties as real and occurrent and the problems in such an analysis. Later I discuss and draw upon Tetens’s work to substantiate my views on functional characterization.