ABSTRACT

Tony Lawson’s (Chapter 1) 1 dual commitment to a critical realist social ontology for economics (CRE) and the specification of mainstream economics by its deterministic ontology, are both well-known and have been heavily debated. 2 I find it difficult to contribute further to such debate, especially in light of his contribution under review for two separate, but closely related reasons. 3 The first is that his position tends to close off progress in debate even if exchange of fire continues. As, for him, the mainstream 4 is (defined by) its ontology, its substantive theoretical content might be of interest, but is rendered somewhat irrelevant and need not be discussed as central in defining our discipline (‘ontology rules ok’). Without wishing to tar all followers of CRE with the same brush, the failure to engage substantively both with economic theory and economic analysis has been particularly striking and observed as such. So, whilst my own position is that the mainstream is primarily defined by the content of its theoretical core and practices (together with a heavy and increasing dose of flexible and flexibly attached econometrics), and Lawson may even agree (but probably does not) with the corresponding characterisation and critique of that substance, he pays it little attention as presumably contributing no more than the epiphenomena of, or illustrative form taken by, our discipline relative to its ontological core. 5 Thus, p. 32, emphasis added:

Certainly the contemporary discipline is dominated by a mainstream tradition. But whilst the concrete substantive content, focus and policy orientations of the latter are highly heterogeneous and continually changing, the project itself is adequately characterised in terms of its enduring reliance, indeed, unceasing insistence, upon methods of mathematical modelling. In effect it is a form of mathematical deductivism in the context of economics.