ABSTRACT
Automobile safety decisions reflect a complex blend of manufacturer initiatives (Svenson, 1984) and government regulations (Bick, Hohenemser & Kates, 1979). Despite the obvious importance of automobile safety, we know of no systematic attempt to develop a socially comprehensive theory of safety design that might guide manufacturers and regulators. The closest we have to such a guide is the suggestion that cost-benefit analysis may be a useful framework for organizing risk information as part of a larger, complex process of making decisions about safety (eg, Coleman, 1976; Lave & Weber, 1970). There are, however, indications that cost-benefit calculations alone are an incomplete basis for safety decisions. One dramatic illustration of this is the case of the Ford Pinto, whose fuel tank was prone to rupture and fire when the vehicle was struck from behind. Analyses done by Ford concluded that the cost of correcting this defect by changing the design of the fuel tank greatly exceeded the expected safety benefits. Nevertheless, unsympathetic jurors found Ford guilty in a massive liability suit brought by relatives of Pinto victims ( Grimshaw versus Ford Motor Co, 1978), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration subsequently ordered a recall of the defective vehicles.
