ABSTRACT
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of United Nations defines food security as a condition ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (1996). This multi-dimensional concept of food security has been widely accepted and adopted around the world. In the Chinese context, however, the notion of food self-sufficiency, grain self-sufficiency in particular, is still paramount when discussing food security in general. While it is understandable that populous countries tend to prefer achieving food security by following a policy of self-sufficiency, China appears to be taking a rather extreme approach to grain self-sufficiency. In 1996, China officially announced the 95% self-sufficiency rate as the bottom line of its food security, and also pledged to achieve absolute self-sufficiency in wheat, rice and corn (State Council, P. R. China, 1996). During the global food crisis in 2007/2008, China introduced the first ever national mid-to long-term food security plan (2008-2020), in which the government reiterated its commitment to achieve a 95% self-sufficiency rate in grain supply and 100% self-sufficiency rate in the supply of cereals (State Council, P. R. China, 2008). However, official data clearly show that China’s grain imports have continued to grow in spite of increased domestic grain production in the last decade (Table 2.1). From 2004 to 2014, China’s total grain imports increased by nearly 300%, and imports of rice, wheat and corn increased over 800%. In 2014, the 95% self-sufficiency rate was apparently breached when China’s grain imports (including soybeans) reached 100 million tonnes, representing over 16% of the domestic production. China’s grain self-sufficiency policy has proved to be extremely costly, and
has generated considerable pressure on its domestic environment not only limited to land and water resources. First, the country’s remarkable increase in grain production was attained by intensive farming and excessive use of chemical fertilizers, both threatening the long-term sustainability of the country’s agriculture. Second, such a food policy imposes heavy financial
burdens on the government. According to an OECD study, the central government of China subsidized its farmers with USD 165 billion in 2012 alone (30% more than the European Union standard and a rise of 200% over the previous five years) (Potter, 2014). Third, even though the Chinese government set the grain purchase price well above the international price, it still failed to sufficiently compensate farmers due to the rapidly rising production cost. As a result, farmers are discouraged to switch to cash crops that would make better use of land resources, and thirsty crops such as wheat and corn have become widely grown. Faced with these challenges, China took a historic step to reform its food
security strategy in December 2013 by redefining the country’s food security strategy and for the first time opted for ‘domestic supply with moderate imports’. While imports now form part of the overall national food security strategy, China still upholds the goal of ‘absolute security’ in cereal. And, Chinese president Xi Jinping since he took over power in 2013 has repeatedly said that China must rely on itself to achieve food security (Ren, 2015). With this background, this chapter intends to explore three related ques-
tions: Why is the Chinese government so concerned about food security and why does it emphasize grain self-sufficiency? What triggered China’s decision to reform its food security strategy in 2013? Last but not least, how will China reformulate its new food security strategy? To answer these questions,
Table 2.1 China’s grain production and trade and agricultural trade figures
Grain production Grain imports (million tonnes) Agricultural trade, $billion
Total Cereals Total Cereals Soybeans Total Surplus
2003 431 374 25.3 2.1 20.7 40.1 2.4
2004 470 412 33.5 9.7 20.2 51.1 −4.9
2005 484 428 36.5 6.3 26.6 55.8 −1.5
2006 498 451 37.1 3.6 28.2 63 −1
2007 502 456 37.3 1.6 30.8 77.6 −4.4
2008 529 479 41.3 1.5 37.4 98.6 −18.1
2009 531 482 52.2 3.2 42.6 91.4 −13
2010 547 496 67 5.7 54.8 120.8 −23
2011 571 519 63.9 5.5 52.6 155.6 −34.1
2012 590 540 80.3 14 58.4 175.8 −49.2
2013 602 553 86.5 14.5 63.4 186.7 −51.0
2014 607 557 100 19.5 71.4 194.5 −50.5
Increase 41.0% 48.9% 295.3% 828.6% 244.9% 385.0% −2204.2%
the rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: The first section reviews the origins of China’s food security strategy. In the next section, an analysis of both domestic and external factors that contribute to the mounting pressures for the Chinese government is provided. And, in the third section, the components of China’s recent food strategy reform and new policy measures are identified and explained. A short conclusion is provided in the last section.
