ABSTRACT
Behaviour change policy conveys a powerful image: that of psychologists and scientists, maybe wearing white coats, messing with the minds of citizens, doing experiments on them without their consent, and seeking to manipulate their behaviour. Huddled in offices in the bowels of Whitehall, or maybe working out of windowless rooms in the White House, behavioural scientists are redesigning the messages and regulations that governments make, operating far from the public’s view. The unsuspecting citizen becomes something akin to the subjects of science fiction novels, such as Huxley’s Brave New World or Zamyatin’s We. The emotional response to these developments is to cry out for a more humanistic form of public policy and a more participatory form of governance. The implication is that public policy should be placed firmly in the hands of citizens and their elected representatives. Of course, such an account is a massive stereotype. Yet something of this
viewpoint has emerged as a backdrop to recent academic work on the use of the behavioural sciences in government. Those working from a critical social science perspective observe the rise of ‘the psychological state’ because of a step change in use of psychological and other forms of behavioural research to design public policies (e.g. Jones et al., 2013a, 2013b; Leggett, 2014; Strassheim and Korinek, 2016). This claim is inspired by sociological studies of science and government, which has been subject of much theoretical work in recent years. Drawing on the work of Foucault, the research programme has explored the practice of governmentality in the field of behaviour change (see Jones et al., 2013a: 182-8): the ‘central concern has been to critically evaluate the broader ethical concerns of behavioural governance, which includes tracing geohistorical contingencies of knowledge mobilized in the legitimation of the behaviour change agenda itself ’ (2013a: 190). This line of work presents a subtle set of arguments and claims that an empirical account, such as one presented in this chapter, cannot – and should not – challenge. Nonetheless, it is instructive to find out more about the phenomenon under study and to understand how the use of behavioural ideas and randomised evaluations is limited and structured by the institutions and actors in the political process, which are following political and organisational ends. Of particular interest is the incremental and patchy nature of the diffusion of ideas and how the use of
behavioural sciences meshes with existing standard operating procedures and routines of bureaucracies. The path of ideas in public policy is usually slow – one of gradual diffusion and small changes in operating assumptions – and this route is likely for the use of behavioural sciences. Ideas can still make progress, helped by the fragmented and decentralised policy process; but their evolution is neither predictable or uniform. Nudges do have the power to create innovations in public policies, but they need to be skillfully advocated by bureaucrats, politicians and talented outsiders. The implication of this line of argument is that agency as well as structure plays an important role in the adoption and diffusion of ideas from the behavioural sciences. It implies a more limited use of ideas and evidence than is implied by the critical writers in this field, and public argument and debate play a central role. The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first section reviews the litera-
ture on the use of evidence in public policy in the UK and assesses the progress of ideas from the behavioural sciences, in particular their advocacy by the Behavioural Insights Team; then, the chapter discusses the advantages and challenges of trials to test for evidence; and finally, there is an assessment of the likely progress of behavioural public policy.
