ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been a slow but sure change toward an alternative orientation mind and world as mutually overlapping, hence the qualifying terms embodied, situated, or enactive cognitive science. Most often, however, the Sartrean analysis of the body is seen in terms of the body as it exists as an object for the other rather than the body as it exists for itself as a subject of consciousness. The most obvious similarity, already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, is their rejection of indirect realism and the anti-representationalism that accompanies it. In Action in Perception, Noe discusses the sources in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science upon which the enactive view of perception draws. It examines more carefully how the relational nature of perception brings the body's role in consciousness into focus for both Sartre and Noe. Finally, it shows how Sartre's analysis of consciousness could enrich and deepen the enactivist account.
