ABSTRACT
This paper identifies how ‘civil contingencies’ are addressed in Australia. It describes how responsibilities for emergency management are allocated across Australia’s federated system of government and provides a critical review of the institutional and structural arrangements that are in place. It is argued that, even though Australia’s emergency management arrangements have generally served the community well, there are undoubted limitations. One limitation is the lack of established Commonwealth response powers and weak arrangements to coordinate the Commonwealth response to emergency. This has not proved problematic to date, but preparation for a catastrophic event, of national significance, should not be avoided simply because it has not yet happened. It is further argued that Australia’s arrangements focus on governments and their response to emergencies. They have, to date, largely omitted other players, in particular non-government actors, whether that is private industry, communities or individuals. There is evidence that this is changing with the recent overarching policy statement – the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience. What is required now is work at the local level to develop true local resilience to the impact of inevitable natural hazards such as fire, flood and storm.
