ABSTRACT
The (partially) unexpected fall of the government headed by Silvio Berlusconi in 2011 tarnished the most representative political figure of the centre-right. Berlusconi’s reputation and that of his party for managing the economy were much more severely damaged by the loss of confidence by the international markets than by his sexual misconduct. The choice not to call a new election, but to install a President of the Republic’s government in which parties did not play a direct role, was apparently successful. The main parties’ strategy to distance themselves from a government intent on harsh fiscal policies and welfare cuts while supporting it in parliament may be seen as a Machiavellian stratagem to elude voters’ blame. The resignation of the Monti government in December 2012 – following the comeback of Berlusconi and the withdrawal of his support for the grand coalition government – opened a political campaign that centred on the austerity measures dictated by European institutions. The analysis of this article shows that citizens’ economic pessimism was not devoid of a clear understanding of the performance of political actors, as suggested by their use of this information to orient their vote choice. The electoral results – showing the largest swing-vote in the history of the Italian Republic – produced a hung parliament, and forced the main left-and right-wing parties to unite in another grand coalition. Voters’ behaviour highlights that the great success of the 5SM was not due to retrospective economic discontent, but rather to mistrust of the traditional political actors. Of course, economic distress affected voters’ choice, but partisans assigned responsibility differently, according to their perceptions of the main culprits. Economic voting was therefore mediated by the structure of blame attribution.
