ABSTRACT
This article argues that the lack of focus on institution-building greatly limits the impact of international democracy assistance to post-conflict societies. After ten years of international support, key domestic electoral, human rights and media institutions remain politically biased, are largely unaccountable to their members or society in general, are not transparent in their operations, have no substantial influence on decision making and are in most cases financially unsustainable. Focusing on international assistance to elections, human rights and media, the article reviews the practical experiences of eight post-conflict countries: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, El Salvador and Guatemala. Drawing from the recent work of local research teams within a major comparative research project, it concludes that international assistance has been instrumental in setting up new organizations, but relatively unsuccessful in consolidating effective democratic institutions. Findings show that post-conflict democracy programmes consist mainly of technical, material and financial assistance as well as short-term project aid. This aid may have spurred the growth of many training activities and NGOs that excel in organizing workshops and seminars, but proves unsustainable and largely insignificant in the wider process of democratization. Finally, the international community's ‘democracy template’ seems particularly ill-suited to achieve democracy in post-conflict countries. Focusing on short-term stability, new leadership is legitimized during well-funded elections, but key issues of political control and regulation often remain unaddressed. As a result, a real impact of international assistance on democratic change remains elusive in most post-conflict countries.
